Are Loan Mods Actually Helping Anyone?

Current data shows that 10% of borrowers in California are in default and that 73% of borrowers have negative equity. Ouch.

If you are a homeowner facing foreclosure, you have a number of options available to you. Of them, the first that most borrows try is for a loan modification. On the surface of it, a loan mod seems like a good deal, but the more I think about it, the more I wonder if that is truly the case.

Getting your loan modified is no easy task. The lender is going to be very difficult to deal with and this is going to add to the your already high level of stress. If you are successful, you can expect that the lender will likely reduce the interest rate and the payment. They may also set aside some of the principle on the “back end” and not charge you interest for this balance for some time.

Make no mistake about it though, you will still owe this (extra) money.

At first glance, getting a lower payment and being able to stay in your home (for now) may seem like a very good idea. The reality, however, is often much less appealing.

Why?

Well, there are a number of reasons.

First, you still likely owe far more than your house is worth. This is probably the biggest reason that most loan modifications eventually end up back in foreclosure. Initially, the borrower is very happy to have been able to stay in the home, however, as time passes, the reality of the size of the debt versus the value of the home sets in, and the motivation to keep making those payments eventually weakens.

Remember, in your neighborhood, the vast majority of homes in default do not get their loan modified (if you don’t have a job, you CANNOT get a loan mod). When a loan is not modified, the home is either sold via short sale, or sold at the trustee sale, or taken back by the bank and sold as an REO. In all cases, the sales price(s) of the houses that surround yours are going to be lower than a home that was not sold “in distress”.

What does this mean for you? In means that “comparable sales” are going to keep going down for a while yet, and each time that happens, your house is going to be worth less. The amount you owe, even after a loan mod, is still going to be the same. Bummer.

Making matters worse, in some neighborhoods, homeowners who are capable of making their payments simple stop doing so because they no longer see the point. Their house value is far less than the loan, none of the neighbors are making a payment, and no one has yet been evicted.

This is what we call a “strategic default”.

Regardless of what you call it, the result is still the same; foreclosure takes place and the house is eventually resold at a much lower price – which in turn results in much lower sales comparables.

Fannie-Mae is not ignorant to this problem and that is why they recently introduced their deed for lease program. In this program, the qualifying homeowners facing foreclosure will be able to remain in their homes by signing a lease in connection with the voluntary transfer of the property deed back to the lender.

For many homeowners, this will allow them to stay in their homes, get debt relief, and cut their monthly cost of shelter in half. Not a bad deal for most people.

What has not yet been announced, but what I think is highly likely, is that in a year or two after you deed your home to the lender, you will then be offered a option to buy it back. If that plays out, that is absolutely wonderful for the homeowner.

Think about it; you deed it back to the lender, you get to stay in your house, your debt is eliminated, and eventually you get to buy it back at its now current (lower) market value!

There’s just one problem with this. What about the other 90% of homeowners who aren’t in default but are under water? Don’t you think they are going to want their discount, too?

I’m guessing they will, and if I’m right, that is going to mean a whole lot more strategic defaults.

Very clearly, we are not out of the woods by any stretch of the imagination – despite what you may be reading in today’s news.

How to Get Started as an Investor

It’s no secret that there’s plenty of money to be made in the real estate investing arena. There is, however, a rather large learning curve to get through before you start cashing those checks. Following are six tips to help your journey through the learning curve be a little less bumpy.

Read full article…

US Government Now Largest Operating Subprime Lender

How’s that for a heart-warming headline? The sad reality is that its true. The FHA is now underwriting billions in mortgage for borrowers that cannot qualify for conventional mortgages. Back in 2005, the FHA only insured 2% of mortgage underwritten by banks. Now it, or should I say the tax payer, is backing 25% of mortgages underwritten.

To illustrate the disaster that is potentially pending, 34% of the loans guaranteed by the FHA in 2007, have already gone into default only two years later.

Does anyone see a problem here?

Lets review the ingredients to what is sure to be a double-dip recession:

  1. Unemployment is still rising
  2. The banks are sitting on thousands of foreclosures with thousands more homeowners predicted to go into default in the next few years
  3. Gov’t bailouts are piling on debt faster than you can say “Uncle Sam is on Crack”

The variable in all this that remains out of our collective control is the politics. If this were a “normal” market, I’d say that hell was about to break loose any day. However, its most definitely not “normal” and FHA first time buyers are having a feeding frenzy…for now.

Like other stimulus programs, this one too has its long term consequences and one day, the tax payer is going to have to pay the piper. To see what I mean, read this.

Your comments are always welcome,
TRD

Fitch Projects More RMBS Re-Defaults as HAMP Disappoints

Servicers of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) continue to increase loss mitigation resolutions, including a significant push in the number of loan modifications, according to a report from Fitch Ratings.

As of September 2009, roughly 10% of all RMBS loans and 25% of all subprime loans received at least one modification. A year ago, servicers modified only 3% of all loans, and 7% of subprime loans, according to the report.

Fitch estimated a “conservative” projection of 65% to 75% of subprime delinquencies of 60 days or more that will re-default after 12 months post-modification.

“As in prior statements, market pressures to allow more aggressive [modifications], continued home price declines, and the economy’s effect on job losses factor into this projection,” according to Fitch analysts.

The projection includes re-defaults on loans that received a second and third modification after the first one failed. Roughly 11% of all modified RMBS loans received a second modification, and of the modifications done in Q308, 17% were re-modified, according to the report.

The monthly modification volume dropped from the peak in the middle of 2009, because loan modifications under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) are not considered complete until a three-month trial finishes.

Through HAMP, the US Treasury Department allocates capped incentives to servicers for the modification of loans on the verge of foreclosure.

HAMP’s first modifications did not begin to complete the trial period until early July and are not included in the January through June 2009 results, according to the report. But cumulative modifications increased during the first half of 2009 as servicers continued non-HAMP modifications.

“Initial indications suggest the conversion from trial mod under HAMP to actual finalized
modification status has been disappointing,” according to Fitch analysts.

Through September 2009, there has been no “pick-up” in modification activity stemming from the completion of HAMP trial modifications.

According to[1] a report from the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP), which reviews actions taken by the Treasury, only 1,711 of the 360,000 trial modifications started passed out of the HAMP trial period and into permanence as of September 1.

Subprime Uncle Sam

The FHA makes Countrywide Financial look prudent.

The Treasury has announced new “capital cushion” requirements for financial institutions to reduce excessive risk and prevent taxpayer bailouts. Seems sensible enough. Perhaps the Administration will even impose those safety and soundness standards on federal agencies.

One place to start is the Federal Housing Administration, the nation’s insurer of nearly $750 billion in outstanding mortgages. The agency acknowledged this month that a new but still undisclosed HUD audit has found that FHA’s cash reserve fund is rapidly depleting and may drop below its Congressionally mandated 2% of insurance liabilities by the end of the year.

[1fha]

At a 50 to 1 leverage ratio, the FHA will soon have a smaller capital cushion than did investment bank Bear Stearns on the eve of its crash. (See nearby table.) Its loan delinquency rate (more than 30 days late in payments) is now above 14%, or from two to three times higher than on conventional mortgages. Its cash reserve ratio has fallen by more than two-thirds in three years.

The reason for this financial deterioration is that FHA is underwriting record numbers of high-risk mortgages. Between 2006 and the end of next year, FHA’s insurance portfolio will have expanded to $1 trillion from $410 billion. Today nearly one in four new mortgages carries an FHA guarantee, up from one in 50 in 2006. Through FHA, the Veterans Administration, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, taxpayers now guarantee repayment on more than 80% of all U.S. mortgages. Sources familiar with a new draft HUD report on FHA’s worsening balance sheet tell us that the default rates have risen most rapidly on the most recent loans, i.e., those initiated or refinanced in 2008 and 2009.

All of this means the FHA is making a trillion-dollar housing gamble with taxpayer money as the table stakes. If housing values recover (fingers crossed), default rates will fall and the agency could even make money on its aggressive underwriting. But if housing prices continue their slide in states like Arizona, California, Florida and Nevada—where many FHA borrowers already have negative equity in their homes—taxpayers could face losses of $100 billion or more.

So far Congress has pretended that these liabilities don’t exist because they are technically “off budget.” They stay invisible until they move on-budget when a Fannie Mae-type cash bailout is needed. The Obama Administration is at least finally catching on to these perils and last week proposed some modest reforms. These include appointing a “chief risk officer” at FHA, tightening home appraisals, requiring that FHA lenders have audited financial statements, and increasing the capital requirement of FHA lenders to $1 million up from $250,000. The scandal is that these basic standards weren’t in place years ago.

Unfortunately, Washington won’t touch more significant reforms for fear of angering the powerful nexus of Realtors, mortgage bankers and home builders. As we’ve written for years, the FHA’s main lending problem is that it requires neither lenders nor borrowers to have a sufficient financial stake in mortgage repayment. The FHA’s absurdly low 3.5% down payment policy, in combination with other policies to reduce up-front costs for new homebuyers, means that homebuyers can move into their government-insured home with an equity stake as low as 2.5%. The government’s own housing data prove that low down payments are the single largest predictor of defaults.

Private banks know this. Burned on subprime mortgages, they are back to requiring 10% or even 20% down payments. Congress should at least require a 5% down payment on loans that carry a taxpayer guarantee. If borrowers can’t put at least 5% down, they can’t afford the house.

As for rooting out fraud that contributes to high loss rates, the obvious solution is to drop the 100% guarantee on FHA mortgages. Why not hold banks liable for the first 10% of losses on the housing loans they originate, a reform that has been recommended since as far back as the early Reagan years? No other mortgage insurer insures 100% loan repayment. Alas, while offering its minireforms, the Obama Administration reassured its real-estate pals that FHA insurance will continue to carry “no risk to homeowners or bondholders.”

Which means all the risk is on taxpayers. David Stevens, the FHA commissioner, nonetheless declared this month: “There will be no taxpayer bailout.” That’s also what Barney Frank said about Fannie and Freddie.

More on the Woes of the FDIC

DANIEL WAGNER – Associated Press | Posted: Tuesday, September 22, 2009 10:50 am

A Snow Ball’s Chance in Hell

In my last post, I shared with my readers some soon-to-be-released research on the FDIC and its upcoming challenges. If you haven’t read it, you should.

In tonight’s reading I came across another significant fact worth sharing: According to the New York Times account, ” Fannie (Mae) and Freddie (Mac) now buy or guarantee almost two-thirds of all new mortgages. The Federal Housing Administration guarantees another 25 percent.”

Put another way, the Gov’t is financing 9 out of 10 new mortgages in the United States.

Hmmmm…….

With the S&P500 over 55% off its lows, one could say that the stock market has priced in a V-shaped economic recovery. Damn the torpedoes, baby!

But wait! How could this be? Is the recession really over?

Not so fast, partner!!

  1. We’ve got banks going broke, with more to come, and no money to lend in the meantime.
  2. The only reason that houses are selling at all is because the Gov’t is lending the money, plus giving 1st time buyers a free $8,000 for buying a house. (how else could houses sell with unemployment as high as it is?)
  3. And heck, if you bought a new car recently, you’d have received another $4500 as part of the cash for clunkers trade in program, also courtesy of Uncle Sam.
  4. Delinquency rates are home loans are still extremely high
  5. Oh, and did I mention there’s no jobs?

Seems to me that without all the Gov’t stimulus, GDP would be so far into the toilet, we’d be seeing the D-word instead of “The Great Recession”.

Despite this, the stock market is going no where but up. I don’t know about you, but I don’t see ANY part of this picture that says “sustainable economic recovery”.

What’s the point of this rant?

Do you honestly believe that decades of excess, speculation, and outright fiscal lunacy can honestly be undone in a year or two?

I don’t know about you, but I don’t buy it. If I was a betting man, I’d say how about a “snowball’s chance in hell?”

So what should you do if you are an investor? Same advice as yesterday:

  1. cut your living expenses to the bone
  2. raise as much cash as possible
  3. do as many seller financed purchases as possible (as seller financed deals are also the easiest to renegotiate if needed)
  4. focus on flipping short sales, as opposed to fixing & flipping REOs, because it can be done without the need to tie up any capital

Your comments are always welcome,
TRD

The Hole in the FDIC

The follwing post is an excerpt from a newsletter written by John Mauldin. Of all the research that I’ve been reading about the recession and what to expect next, John’s insights, and particularly this edition, has without a doubt been the most useful in terms of my forming my investment strategy for the coming few years.

In short, now is a time to:

  1. cut your living expenses to the bone
  2. raise as much cash as possible
  3. do as many seller financed purchases as possible (as seller financed deals are also the easiest to renegotiate if needed)
  4. focus on flipping short sales, as opposed to fixing & flipping REOs, because it can be done without the need to tie up any capital

The full version of this, and past editions of John’s newsletters can be found here.

The Hole in the FDIC

And speaking of holes, let’s look at a huge one that is looming at the FDIC. Institutional Risk Analytics (IRA) is maybe the premier bank-analyst service in the country. They charge over six figures for their flagship service. Good friend and Maine fishing buddy Chris Whalen runs the show and was kind enough to send me some of his new data, which they have not yet released to the public. You get it here first. (www.institutionalriskanalytics.com)

IRA takes the data from the FDIC and crunches it with their own set of risk parameters. While the FDIC has a little over 400 banks on its current “watch” list, IRA gives 2,256 banks an “F.” They project that over 1,000 banks will either fold or be taken over during the current cycle. To date in 2009, a total of 92 banks have failed across the country, compared with 25 for all of 2008, according to the FDIC. 900 more to go. Ouch.

jm091809image001

How much money are we talking about? The banks rated F have total insured assets of $4.46 trillion. So far in this cycle banks that have been taken over by the FDIC are showing losses of 25%!

jm091809image002

Turning to a note from IRA: “An important point in the analysis is that estimated losses for failed bank resolutions by the FDIC are running around a quarter of failed bank assets, a level much higher than between 1980 and 1995, when failures cost an average 11 percent. Our firm’s long-held view of the likely loss rate peak for the US banks in this credit cycle is 2x 1990 loss rates or, as noted by the IMF, around 4 percent of total loans. Since total loans and leases held by all FDIC-insured banks was some $7.7 trillion as of Q2 2009, the IMF estimate implies a cumulative loss of over $300 billion.

“If you start with the internal assumptions used by our firm that roughly half of the banks currently rated “F” or some 1,000 banks will fail and/or be merged with another institution and that the loss to the FDIC bank insurance fund will be approximately 20-25% of total assets, then the cost of these resolutions to the FDIC through the full credit downturn could be in excess of $400-500 billion. Keep in mind that in making this alarming estimate we ignore other banks currently in ratings strata above “F” and that some of these institutions may indeed fail as well. Also, our overall “worst case” or maximum probable loss (“MPL”) for large US banks above $10 billion in assets is $800 billion through the current credit cycle.”

From almost $60 billion last fall, the FDIC’s reserves have been drawn down to only about $10 billion today (after set-asides), a 16-year low. A quick look at the FDIC’s own data shows us how inadequate those reserves are compared to the deposits they are now insuring. The FDIC only has about two-tenths of one cent for every dollar of assets it covers. Look at this chart from my friends at Casey Research.

jm091809image003

The FDIC can borrow $100 billion in an emergency line of credit, and through 2010 it can get another $500 billion. But if and when that money is borrowed, it will have to be paid back. Remember the money that was lost in the savings and loan crisis 20 years ago? The FDIC had to borrow a mere $15 billion. We are still paying that 30-year loan back.

The FDIC has two options to replenish its insurance fund in the short run: it can charge banks higher fees or it can take the more radical step of borrowing from the US Treasury. It has already levied a “special fee” that garnered over $5 billion.

Now, let’s hold that thought, as we will come back to it in a minute.

A growing economy requires a growing credit market. If credit is shrinking it signals a receding economy. But banks are having to raise capital, and that means many banks are having to curtail lending. First, let’s look at a chart of total bank loans for the last five years. Notice that there was a big jump in late 2008 as commercial paper became hard to obtain and businesses hit their credit lines. Since then banks have been cutting back.

jm091809image004

This next chart is again total bank loans but goes back to 1947. Notice that loan growth was relatively smooth with only a few sideways drifts during recessions and never dropping significantly, as it has in the last year. And the data suggests that banks intend to keep reducing their loan exposure as they try to increase their capital (at least the large number of banks that have problems).

jm091809image005

Consumer credit-card lending is down. Banks have cut their outstanding and unused bank lines to corporations. I can go on and on, but you get the picture. Remember the money that the Fed used to purchase toxic assets so that banks could lend? They are increasingly using that money to buy Fannie and Freddie loans and banking the interest in an effort to improve their profitability.

Why are they raising capital? Because their loan losses are high and rising. Look at this chart from Northern Trust. What it shows is consumer loan losses rising, and so far there is no sign of those losses topping out. The lines are still going up. The same can be said for real estate loans at commercial banks, which are now running over 9% delinquent. These are loans the banks kept on their books.

jm091809image006

Everyone knows that commercial real estate loans are the next shoe to drop, and write-offs may be as large as $400 billion. This will force some banks to go under, but other banks will simply have to absorb the losses.

Now, let’s come back to the FDIC. Sheila Bair, who heads the agency, has emphatically said that the FDIC will not ask Congress for a capital infusion. That means, as noted above, that the FDIC will have to either use their credit lines or ask for more “one-time” special-fee contributions.

If the FDIC borrows the money, and it is highly likely they will, they are going to have to raise the rates they charge member banks for the government backing. And to pay back $3-400 billion? Rates will have to be raised quite high, on the very banks struggling to raise capital and make a profit.

This is going to be a huge drain on future profits of US banks for a very long time. It is going to make it even harder for them to increase their capital – and they need to. But it has to happen. Zombie banks, those that are bound to fail, need to be taken out and put into stronger hands so that credit growth can once again start to rise. But this will not happen overnight. It is going to take time.

While I am writing about US banks, this is a problem all over the developed world. Banks that have to raise capital and reduce loans are not growing credit and are a drag on growth. As credit shrinks it is a large deflationary force. And that is not even taking into account the implosion of the shadow banking system.

Yes, we are seeing statistical growth in the economy this quarter and probably the next. But unemployment is rising and wages and incomes are falling. We will go into that next week.

We are in for a very poor, jobless recovery, and the risk of falling into a double-dip recession is quite high. The stock market is pricing in a steep V-shaped recovery in both GDP and corporate profits. I am not convinced.

Staying in the Shadows for Years to Come

On September 2nd the current foreclosure moratorium was to be lifted, according to my friend at the Bank of America.  Interestingly enough, the BofA was already exempt from the moratorium, and despite that, they’ve been loathed to add to their REO inventory, much less sell any of it.

In the circles I swim in, the conventional wisdom is that the shadow inventory (houses that are now REO but not yet for sale on the MLS) has to be released to the market at some point, and, when that happens, prices are going to continue to decline at least another 10%. A basic understanding of economics would suggest that 10% is not unreasonable, give the sheer (rumored) amount of the shadow inventory.

I have to admit though, that I’m now starting to think “at some point” will never happen, and that the banks are going to continue to parcel out the REO inventory in dribs and drabs for years to come.

Why?

There are a number of reasons that I’m starting to change my view on this.

Leading the charge is the fact that bank CEOs like to keep their banks in business, and to do that, they need to have money to lend. If they start selling REOs in volume, prices must decline and the net result of that will be that the bank’s assets will take a huge hit. As banks capital requirements are set by the regulators, a drop in assets will mean that more reserve capital must be set aside and that will, in turn, reduce the amount of capital available for lending.

With nothing to lend, a bank is essentially out of business, and a CEO is out of a job.

Next on my list is the fact that it is probably cheaper to let a family stay in a house they aren’t making payments on, than it is to hire lawyers, go through the foreclosure process, and then be saddled with all the costs associated with insuring and maintaining an empty house. Essentially, the delinquent homeowner is a caretaker that doesn’t charge the bank anything to look after the house.

In other words, why foreclose on a ton of houses all at once, and then be saddled with massive costs, when you can just let John and Mary live there (even if they aren’t making payments), until such time as you are ready to foreclose and sell in an orderly fashion?

Given the number of REOs on the banks books now, plus the number of borrowers that go into default on a daily basis, it could take years and years to slowly bleed off all that inventory.

The net result of a controlled redistribution of these assets is that they don’t get sold at fire sale prices and the underlying market for 1st time buyers remains very healthy – even if it is artificially so. Stability, be it contrived or real, has the same net effect, increased consumer confidence – a much needed ingredient if there is to be an end to the recession.

Your comments are always welcome,
TRD

Housing Production Dips in July as Tax Credit Expires, CBIA Announces

The story below, I believe, is further evidence that a housing recovery is yet further out than many believe.

Consider the following facts:

  1. unemployment is still very high
  2. consumer confidence is still very low
  3. the state is essentially broke
  4. last quarter’s GDP numbers were really just TARP spending
  5. Most of today’s first time buyers will be under water in 3 – 6 months as inventories inevitably rise (all those foreclosures have to be put up for sale at some point)
  6. used houses can be purchased for FAR below their replacement costs

The low end of the real estate market is on fire, to be sure; however, the only things driving it are low interest rates and an “artificial” lack of inventory. I can’t help but wonder how much longer that will last. Can you?

Your comments are always welcome,

TRD

August 24, 2009

SACRAMENTO – California homebuilders pulled back on new-home production in July as homebuyers retreated from housing markets around the state following the discontinuation of the successful homebuyer tax credit early in the month, the California Building Industry Association announced today.

“Our homebuilders reported a significant drop in traffic last month, largely due to the state closing the window on the homebuyer tax credit,” said Robert Rivinius, CBIA’s President and CEO, who noted that the Franchise Tax Board stopped taking applications for the $10,000 new-home credit at the beginning of July. “Activity stopped as quickly as it started, which is bad news for housing and the broader economy.”

more…

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