Fitch Projects More RMBS Re-Defaults as HAMP Disappoints

Servicers of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) continue to increase loss mitigation resolutions, including a significant push in the number of loan modifications, according to a report from Fitch Ratings.

As of September 2009, roughly 10% of all RMBS loans and 25% of all subprime loans received at least one modification. A year ago, servicers modified only 3% of all loans, and 7% of subprime loans, according to the report.

Fitch estimated a “conservative” projection of 65% to 75% of subprime delinquencies of 60 days or more that will re-default after 12 months post-modification.

“As in prior statements, market pressures to allow more aggressive [modifications], continued home price declines, and the economy’s effect on job losses factor into this projection,” according to Fitch analysts.

The projection includes re-defaults on loans that received a second and third modification after the first one failed. Roughly 11% of all modified RMBS loans received a second modification, and of the modifications done in Q308, 17% were re-modified, according to the report.

The monthly modification volume dropped from the peak in the middle of 2009, because loan modifications under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) are not considered complete until a three-month trial finishes.

Through HAMP, the US Treasury Department allocates capped incentives to servicers for the modification of loans on the verge of foreclosure.

HAMP’s first modifications did not begin to complete the trial period until early July and are not included in the January through June 2009 results, according to the report. But cumulative modifications increased during the first half of 2009 as servicers continued non-HAMP modifications.

“Initial indications suggest the conversion from trial mod under HAMP to actual finalized
modification status has been disappointing,” according to Fitch analysts.

Through September 2009, there has been no “pick-up” in modification activity stemming from the completion of HAMP trial modifications.

According to[1] a report from the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP), which reviews actions taken by the Treasury, only 1,711 of the 360,000 trial modifications started passed out of the HAMP trial period and into permanence as of September 1.

Subprime Uncle Sam

The FHA makes Countrywide Financial look prudent.

The Treasury has announced new “capital cushion” requirements for financial institutions to reduce excessive risk and prevent taxpayer bailouts. Seems sensible enough. Perhaps the Administration will even impose those safety and soundness standards on federal agencies.

One place to start is the Federal Housing Administration, the nation’s insurer of nearly $750 billion in outstanding mortgages. The agency acknowledged this month that a new but still undisclosed HUD audit has found that FHA’s cash reserve fund is rapidly depleting and may drop below its Congressionally mandated 2% of insurance liabilities by the end of the year.

[1fha]

At a 50 to 1 leverage ratio, the FHA will soon have a smaller capital cushion than did investment bank Bear Stearns on the eve of its crash. (See nearby table.) Its loan delinquency rate (more than 30 days late in payments) is now above 14%, or from two to three times higher than on conventional mortgages. Its cash reserve ratio has fallen by more than two-thirds in three years.

The reason for this financial deterioration is that FHA is underwriting record numbers of high-risk mortgages. Between 2006 and the end of next year, FHA’s insurance portfolio will have expanded to $1 trillion from $410 billion. Today nearly one in four new mortgages carries an FHA guarantee, up from one in 50 in 2006. Through FHA, the Veterans Administration, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, taxpayers now guarantee repayment on more than 80% of all U.S. mortgages. Sources familiar with a new draft HUD report on FHA’s worsening balance sheet tell us that the default rates have risen most rapidly on the most recent loans, i.e., those initiated or refinanced in 2008 and 2009.

All of this means the FHA is making a trillion-dollar housing gamble with taxpayer money as the table stakes. If housing values recover (fingers crossed), default rates will fall and the agency could even make money on its aggressive underwriting. But if housing prices continue their slide in states like Arizona, California, Florida and Nevada—where many FHA borrowers already have negative equity in their homes—taxpayers could face losses of $100 billion or more.

So far Congress has pretended that these liabilities don’t exist because they are technically “off budget.” They stay invisible until they move on-budget when a Fannie Mae-type cash bailout is needed. The Obama Administration is at least finally catching on to these perils and last week proposed some modest reforms. These include appointing a “chief risk officer” at FHA, tightening home appraisals, requiring that FHA lenders have audited financial statements, and increasing the capital requirement of FHA lenders to $1 million up from $250,000. The scandal is that these basic standards weren’t in place years ago.

Unfortunately, Washington won’t touch more significant reforms for fear of angering the powerful nexus of Realtors, mortgage bankers and home builders. As we’ve written for years, the FHA’s main lending problem is that it requires neither lenders nor borrowers to have a sufficient financial stake in mortgage repayment. The FHA’s absurdly low 3.5% down payment policy, in combination with other policies to reduce up-front costs for new homebuyers, means that homebuyers can move into their government-insured home with an equity stake as low as 2.5%. The government’s own housing data prove that low down payments are the single largest predictor of defaults.

Private banks know this. Burned on subprime mortgages, they are back to requiring 10% or even 20% down payments. Congress should at least require a 5% down payment on loans that carry a taxpayer guarantee. If borrowers can’t put at least 5% down, they can’t afford the house.

As for rooting out fraud that contributes to high loss rates, the obvious solution is to drop the 100% guarantee on FHA mortgages. Why not hold banks liable for the first 10% of losses on the housing loans they originate, a reform that has been recommended since as far back as the early Reagan years? No other mortgage insurer insures 100% loan repayment. Alas, while offering its minireforms, the Obama Administration reassured its real-estate pals that FHA insurance will continue to carry “no risk to homeowners or bondholders.”

Which means all the risk is on taxpayers. David Stevens, the FHA commissioner, nonetheless declared this month: “There will be no taxpayer bailout.” That’s also what Barney Frank said about Fannie and Freddie.

Will the REAL Unemployment Please Stand (and be counted)

The following snippet was written by John Mauldin. The full article can be found on his website.

First, the unemployment rate is now officially at 9.7%. We are approaching the official high we last saw at the end of the double-dip1982 recession. In the chart below, notice that unemployment rose throughout 1980 and then began to decline, before rising rapidly as the economy entered the second recession within two years. Also notice the rapid drop in unemployment following that recession, as opposed to the recessions of 1991-92 and 2001-02, which have been characterized as jobless recoveries. Unemployment was as low as 3.8% in 2000 and saw a cycle low of 4.4% in early 2007.

(For the record, all this data is available on the Bureau of Labor Statistics website. There is a treasure trove of data. They are quite open about what they do and how they do it. When I call to ask a question, they are quite helpful. How people interpret the data is not their fault.)

jm092509image001

This headline unemployment number (9.7%) is what we see when we read the paper. What we typically don’t see is the real number of unemployed. For instance, if you have not actively looked for a job in the last four weeks, even if you would like one, you are not counted as unemployed. You are called a “marginally attached” or “discouraged” worker. Often there are very good reasons for this. You could be sick, dealing with a family emergency, going back to school, or not have transportation.

Right now, about one-third of marginally attached workers actively want jobs but have not bothered to look because they believe there are no jobs in their area, at least not for them. If you add that extra 758,000 to the unemployment data, you get what is called U-4 unemployment, which today is 10.2%. If you count all marginally attached workers the unemployment number is 11% (U-5 unemployment).

And if you add those who are employed part-time for economic reasons (i.e., they can’t get full-time jobs) the unemployment number rises to 16.8%. (That is called U-6 unemployment.)

A Snow Ball’s Chance in Hell

In my last post, I shared with my readers some soon-to-be-released research on the FDIC and its upcoming challenges. If you haven’t read it, you should.

In tonight’s reading I came across another significant fact worth sharing: According to the New York Times account, ” Fannie (Mae) and Freddie (Mac) now buy or guarantee almost two-thirds of all new mortgages. The Federal Housing Administration guarantees another 25 percent.”

Put another way, the Gov’t is financing 9 out of 10 new mortgages in the United States.

Hmmmm…….

With the S&P500 over 55% off its lows, one could say that the stock market has priced in a V-shaped economic recovery. Damn the torpedoes, baby!

But wait! How could this be? Is the recession really over?

Not so fast, partner!!

  1. We’ve got banks going broke, with more to come, and no money to lend in the meantime.
  2. The only reason that houses are selling at all is because the Gov’t is lending the money, plus giving 1st time buyers a free $8,000 for buying a house. (how else could houses sell with unemployment as high as it is?)
  3. And heck, if you bought a new car recently, you’d have received another $4500 as part of the cash for clunkers trade in program, also courtesy of Uncle Sam.
  4. Delinquency rates are home loans are still extremely high
  5. Oh, and did I mention there’s no jobs?

Seems to me that without all the Gov’t stimulus, GDP would be so far into the toilet, we’d be seeing the D-word instead of “The Great Recession”.

Despite this, the stock market is going no where but up. I don’t know about you, but I don’t see ANY part of this picture that says “sustainable economic recovery”.

What’s the point of this rant?

Do you honestly believe that decades of excess, speculation, and outright fiscal lunacy can honestly be undone in a year or two?

I don’t know about you, but I don’t buy it. If I was a betting man, I’d say how about a “snowball’s chance in hell?”

So what should you do if you are an investor? Same advice as yesterday:

  1. cut your living expenses to the bone
  2. raise as much cash as possible
  3. do as many seller financed purchases as possible (as seller financed deals are also the easiest to renegotiate if needed)
  4. focus on flipping short sales, as opposed to fixing & flipping REOs, because it can be done without the need to tie up any capital

Your comments are always welcome,
TRD

Staying in the Shadows for Years to Come

On September 2nd the current foreclosure moratorium was to be lifted, according to my friend at the Bank of America.  Interestingly enough, the BofA was already exempt from the moratorium, and despite that, they’ve been loathed to add to their REO inventory, much less sell any of it.

In the circles I swim in, the conventional wisdom is that the shadow inventory (houses that are now REO but not yet for sale on the MLS) has to be released to the market at some point, and, when that happens, prices are going to continue to decline at least another 10%. A basic understanding of economics would suggest that 10% is not unreasonable, give the sheer (rumored) amount of the shadow inventory.

I have to admit though, that I’m now starting to think “at some point” will never happen, and that the banks are going to continue to parcel out the REO inventory in dribs and drabs for years to come.

Why?

There are a number of reasons that I’m starting to change my view on this.

Leading the charge is the fact that bank CEOs like to keep their banks in business, and to do that, they need to have money to lend. If they start selling REOs in volume, prices must decline and the net result of that will be that the bank’s assets will take a huge hit. As banks capital requirements are set by the regulators, a drop in assets will mean that more reserve capital must be set aside and that will, in turn, reduce the amount of capital available for lending.

With nothing to lend, a bank is essentially out of business, and a CEO is out of a job.

Next on my list is the fact that it is probably cheaper to let a family stay in a house they aren’t making payments on, than it is to hire lawyers, go through the foreclosure process, and then be saddled with all the costs associated with insuring and maintaining an empty house. Essentially, the delinquent homeowner is a caretaker that doesn’t charge the bank anything to look after the house.

In other words, why foreclose on a ton of houses all at once, and then be saddled with massive costs, when you can just let John and Mary live there (even if they aren’t making payments), until such time as you are ready to foreclose and sell in an orderly fashion?

Given the number of REOs on the banks books now, plus the number of borrowers that go into default on a daily basis, it could take years and years to slowly bleed off all that inventory.

The net result of a controlled redistribution of these assets is that they don’t get sold at fire sale prices and the underlying market for 1st time buyers remains very healthy – even if it is artificially so. Stability, be it contrived or real, has the same net effect, increased consumer confidence – a much needed ingredient if there is to be an end to the recession.

Your comments are always welcome,
TRD

A Peferct Foreclosure Storm

I came across the following quote in my morning reading this morning, and, as I believe it to be absolutely true, thought I’d be remiss if I didn’t pass it along.

Oh, and one other item I thought I’d share was some points that were covered in a conversation I had recently with a Realtor in San Diego who does a lot of business in Rancho Santa Fe (where are the very, very expensive homes are). He told me that he is starting to see more and more million-dollar-plus price drops in that market as well as more and more of these “wealthy” owners are coming to him asking how much they could get if they sold their house in today’s market.

In other words, the super-rich appear to be starting to feel the pinch just like everybody else.

——

“If the economy is improving, do we really have millions more
foreclosures coming? According to the U.S. Treasury, the answer is
yes. In written testimony to Congress, Assistant Secretary for
Financial Institutions, Michael Barr said that, regardless of the
success of mortgage modification efforts, we should still expect
millions more foreclosures.

Mr. Barr’s testimony is certainly not welcome news for those
anticipating a significant recovery in the housing market. In fact, it
is an indication that significant recovery is still years away.

And there are other factors that confirm the fragile state of both the
economy and the housing market. Recent reports have indicated that
there are almost 3 million active, interest-only loans with a total
value of almost $1 trillion, with loans of about $500 billion set to
reset within the next 30 months. Then we have a large group of Option
Arm mortgages set to recast during the next 2 years. These loans have
a combined value of more than $125 billion.

The rising number of bankruptcies, up 36% in the second quarter over
last year, with wealthy families filing at double that rate, creates a
“perfect storm” of disastrous consequences for the housing market.
With the likely prospect of millions more foreclosures coming, home
prices and home sales will remain depressed until the market can
achieve stabilization. And achieving stabilization will be a slow and
painful process.”

—–

Your comments are always welcome,
TRD

San Diego County Median Home Price Up Third Month in a Row

The following clipping paints a picture that I think could confuse some investors.

The article reports that prices have been on the rise as of late, and while I don’t dispute that, I believe the trend is going to be short lived. Why?

Shadow inventory.

For example, Bank of America has 20,000 REOs on their books in San Diego County alone. These houses are not yet for sale, and therefore are not reported in the “months of unsold inventory” statistic that you can find on this site. My contacts at BofA tell me that these properties are going to be brought to market in Q4. In the interim, foreclosures continue to pile up due to the huge volume of Alt-A mortgage resets that are now taking place.

Given the dire employment situation, and the data noted above, how can price increases be sustained? If you have ideas, I’m all ears.

Median_Prices_Up

Your comments are always welcome,

TRD

Home Prices Drop at a Slower Rate

S&P/Case-Shiller index down 18.1% year over year, but monthly drop narrows to 0.6% in April.

By Les Christie, CNNMoney.com
Last Updated: June 30, 2009: 10:25 AM ET

NEW YORK (CNNMoney.com) — Home prices continued to tumble in April, falling 18.1% from a year earlier — but the change from March narrowed sharply, indicating that housing markets may be starting to turn.

The 20-city slice of the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price index recorded a drop of 0.6% from March to April, compared with a 2.2% drop in the prior month. The index has declined every month since July 2006.

“The pace of decline in residential real estate slowed in April,” says David Blitzer, Chairman of the Index Committee at Standard & Poor’s. “Thirteen of the 20 metro areas also saw improvement in their annual return compared to that of March.”

Not only that but every metro area save one — Charlotte, N.C. — reported improvement in their monthly return compared with March.

“While one month’s data cannot determine if a turnaround has begun, it seems that some stabilization may be appearing in some of the regions,” said Blitzer. “We are entering the seasonally strong period in the housing market, so it will take some time to determine if a recovery is really here.”

Blitzer pointed to some factors that may be lifting the housing markets. For one thing, the stock market bottomed out in March and started a strong recovery. The S&P 500 has gained about 37% since then. Consumer confidence has also improved, making house hunters more likely to pull the trigger on deals.

Not all optimistic: The housing market picture is still very murky, according to Pat Newport, a real estate analyst with IHS Global Insight. He’s not convinced that the improved April report means much more than a seasonal variation in housing markets. Spring is, historically, a strong time of year for housing markets.

He said that not only are home prices still falling but other metrics, such as unemployment and foreclosure rates, are worsening as well.

“Foreclosures are still driving markets, and the rate of foreclosure is still going up,” Newport said. “I think that’s going to continue”

Job losses will all but guarantee that will happen, according to Newport, especially since price declines have put so many homeowners underwater, owing more on their mortgages than their homes are worth. By some calculations as many as 20% of homeowners are underwater.

When people are underwater and they’re losing their jobs or some of their income, that’s bound to result in more foreclosures, more vacant homes for sale and more downward pressure on prices.

Huge declines from peaks: Phoenix, where homes have lost 35.3% of their value over the past 12 months, was the worst performing market over that period. Las Vegas prices plunged 32.2% and San Francisco dropped 28%.

Denver prices fell the least over the last 12 months, down 4.9%, followed by Dallas at 5% and Boston at 7.7%.

Prices in Dallas rose 1.7% between March and April, the largest increase among the 20 cities. Las Vegas prices dropped 3.5%, the biggest decline — which was still narrower than the month before.

Dallas also has suffered the smallest decline from the top of its market, off just 9.6% from its peak in June 2007. The rest of the cities have all suffered double-digit percentage drops from their peaks, with the worst being Phoenix, down 54.1% from June 2006.

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